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Future smart cities and intelligent world will have connected vehicles and smart cars as its indispensable
and most essential components. The communication and interaction among such connected entities in this
vehicular internet of things (IoT) domain, which also involves smart traffic infrastructure, road-side sensors,
restaurant with beacons, autonomous emergency vehicles, etc., offer innumerable real-time user applications
and provide safer and pleasant driving experience to consumers. Having more than 100 million lines of code
and hundreds of sensors, these connected vehicles (CVs) expose a large attack surface, which can be remotely
compromised and exploited by malicious attackers. Security and privacy are serious concerns that impede the
adoption of smart connected cars, which if not properly addressed will have grave implications with risk to
human life and limb. In this research, we present a formalized dynamic groups and attribute-based access
control (ABAC) model (referred as CV-ABACG) for smart cars ecosystem, where the proposed model not only
considers system wide attributes-based security policies but also takes into account the individual user privacy
preferences for allowing or denying service notifications, alerts and operations to on-board resources. Further,
we introduce a novel notion of groups in vehicular IoT, which are dynamically assigned to moving entities
like connected cars, based on their current GPS coordinates, speed or other attributes, to ensure relevance
of location and time sensitive notification services to the consumers, to provide administrative benefits to
manage large numbers of smart entities, and to enable attributes and alerts inheritance for fine-grained security
authorization policies. We present proof of concept implementation of our model in AWS cloud platform
demonstrating real-world uses cases along with performance metrics.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Access Control, Smart Cars, Connected Vehicles, Internet of Things,
Authorization, Attribute-Based Access Control, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Autonomous Cars, Security,
Privacy, Cloud Computing
1 INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) has become a dominant technology which has proliferated to different
application domains including health-care, homes, industry, power-grid, to make lives smarter.
It is predicted [2] that the global IoT market will grow to $457 Billion by year 2020, attaining
a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 28.5%. Automation is leading the world today, and
with ‘things’ around sensing and acting on their own or with a remote user command, has given
humans to have anything accessible with a finger touch. Data generated by these smart devices
unleash countless business opportunities and offer customer targeted services. IoT smart devices
along with ‘infinite’ capabilities of cloud computing are ideally matched with desirable synergy in
current technology-oriented world, which has been often termed by researchers as cloud-enabled,
cloud-centric or cloud-assisted IoT in literature [21, 26, 27, 42, 49].
IoT is embraced by every industry with automobile manufacturers and transportation among
the most aggressive. The global connected car market is expected to reach USD 219.21 billion by
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2025 [10] with a CAGR of 14.8%. Vehicular IoT inherits intrinsic IoT characteristics but dynamic
pairing, mobility of vehicles, real-time, location sensitivity are some features which separates it
from common IoT applications. The vision of smart city incorporates intelligent transportation
where connected vehicles (CVs) can ‘talk’ to each other (V2V) and exchange information to ensure
driver safety and offer location-based services. These intelligent vehicles can also interact with
smart roadside infrastructure (V2I), with pedestrian on road (V2H) or send data to the central
cloud for processing and use. Basic safety messages (BSMs) are exchanged among moving entities
using commonly used WiFi like secure and reliable Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC)
protocol. Vehicles can receive speed limit notification, flash flood alerts or deer threat warnings on
car dashboard or with a seat vibration. A car will receive information about nearby parking garages,
restaurant offers or remote engine monitoring by authorized mechanic with nearby repair facility
and discounts updating automatically. These services will provide pleasant travel experience to
drivers and unleash business potential in this intelligent transportation domain. Smart internet
connected vehicles embed softwares having more than 100 million lines of code to control critical
systems and functionality, with plethora of sensors and electronic control units (ECUs) on board
generating huge amounts of data so these vehicles are often termed as ‘datacenter on wheels’.
The conventionally isolated and disconnected vehicles now get exposed to external environment
and internet, they become vulnerable to cyber attacks. Common security vulnerabilities including
buffer overflow, malware, privilege escalation, and trojans etc. can be easily exploited in connected
vehicles. Other potential threats include untrustworthy or fake messages from smart objects,
malicious software injection, data privacy, ECU hacking and control, and spoofing connected
vehicle sensor. With broad attack surface exposed via air-bag ECU, On-Board Diagnostics (OBD)
port, USB, Bluetooth, remote key, and tire-pressure monitoring system etc. these attacks have
become much easier to orchestrate. In-vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) bus also needs
security to protect message exchange among ECUs. Further, communication with external networks
including cellular, WiFi and insecure public networks of gas stations, toll roads, service garages, or
after-market dongles are a big threat to connected vehicles security. Cyber incidents including Jeep
[65] and Tesla Model X [62] hacks where engine was stopped and steering remotely controlled
demonstrate security vulnerabilities. Uber self driving car accident [19] in 2018 was due to a
disabled emergency stop system. It could have been a result of remote adversary disabling the
system, thereby compromising their complete fleet on the ground. Smart car incidents have serious
implications as they can even result in loss of human life.
Access control [31, 57, 58] mechanisms are widely used to restrict unauthorized access to re-
sources and secure communication among entities. Attribute-based access control (ABAC) [46, 48]
provides finer granularity and offers flexibility in distributed multi-entity communication scenar-
ios, which considers characteristics of participating entities along with system and environment
properties to determine access decision. Smart cars ecosystem involves dynamic interaction and
message exchange among connected objects, which must be authorized. It is necessary that only
legitimate entities are allowed to control on-board sensors, data messages and send notifications.
Further, user-centric privacy requires that end-users and customers can control what kind of
alerts they want to receive, what advertisements they are interested or who can access their car’s
critical sensors, etc. This paper focuses on the access control needs in connected smart cars and
proposes an attribute-based access control model for connected vehicles1 ecosystem, referred as
CV-ABACG. Our solution considers the attributes of moving entities like current location, speed
etc. to dynamically assign them to various groups (predefined by smart city administration), for
1In this research paper, the terms smart cars and connected vehicles have been used interchangeably which also subsumes
autonomous vehicles.
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(a) Four Layered Architecture (b) Vehicular IoT Components in E-ACO Layers
Fig. 1. Extended Access Control Oriented Architecture [42]
implementing attributes-based security policies, and also incorporate user-specific privacy prefer-
ences for ensuring relevance of notifications service in constantly changing and mobile smart cars
ecosystem. We implemented a prototype of our model as an external authorization engine hooked
into the widely used AWS (Amazon Web Services) cloud platform [3].
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work and reviews the
extended access control architecture (E-ACO) recently proposed for vehicular IoT environment.
Section 3 highlights multi-layered authorization requirements and emphasize the need to introduce
dynamic groups in smart cars applications. Section 4 presents and formalizes our proposed groups
and attribute-based access control model (CV-ABACG) for connected vehicles ecosystem. Section 5
provides AWS cloud implementation of dynamic groups assignment of moving entities based on
attributes and discusses our external policy decision and enforcement engine for security policies
along with detailed performance metrics and evaluation. Section 6 summarizes our work.
2 RELATEDWORK
Vehicular IoT and smart cars involve dynamic communications and data exchange which requires
access controls to restrict within authorized entities. In this section, we first discuss a recently pro-
posed extended access control architecture (E-ACO) which focuses on access control requirements
in connected vehicles. We also highlight some important work done by government and private
agencies to gauge cyber risks and security measures in smart vehicles.
2.1 Extended Access Control Oriented Architecture
Several IoT architectures with multi-layer stack have been discussed in literature [22–24, 28, 34].
Alsehri and Sandhu [23] recently presented a general IoT architecture which includes virtual objects
[53] and cloud as two middleware layers. Virtual objects resolve IoT issues of heterogeneity and
connectivity whereas on-demand capabilities of cloud are in cloud service layer. Gupta and Sandhu
[35, 42, 43] extended this IoT architecture for specific vehicular IoT and connected vehicles domain.
This extended access control architecture (E-ACO), shown in Figure 1, introduced clustered objects
(like smart cars and traffic lights) which are objects with multiple individual sensors. Also, these
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clustered objects have applications (for example, lane departure or safety warning system in cars)
installed on board, which is usually not the case in general IoT realm. Shown in Figure 1(a), E-ACO
is a four-layered architecture defined as follows:
Object Layer : This is the bottom most layer which represents real physical clustered objects and
sensors along with applications installed on them. In-vehicle communication at this layer is mainly
supported by Ethernet and CAN technologies, whereas communication across clustered objects is
done using DSRC (used for BSM exchange in V2V or V2X communication), WiFi, or LTE etc. It
should be noted that each layer in E-ACO architecture interacts within itself and with entities in
adjacent layers, as marked by arrows in the figure. Therefore, object layer will interact with users
at the bottom and virtual object layer above it.
Virtual Object Layer : This layer acts as an intermediate between cloud services and physical layer,
which offers necessary abstraction by creating cyber entities for physical objects in object layer. In
connected vehicles domain, where cars move across different terrains where internet connectivity
can be an issue, it is important to have cyber entities which maintain the state of the corresponding
physical object as best known and to be updated when connectivity is restored. When two sensors
s1 and s2 across different vehicles interact with each other, the order of communication using virtual
objects will follow s1 to vs1 (virtual entity of sensor s1), vs1 to vs2 and vs2 to physical sensor s2.
Cloud Services and Application Layer : As applications use cloud services, therefore these two
layers are discussed together. On-board sensors generate data which is stored and processed by
cloud services, which is used by applications to offer services to end-users. Cyber entities of physical
objects can be created in cloud layer which provides a persistent state information of objects. It is
important to mention that central cloud may incur latency and bandwidth issues in time-sensitive
applications which can be resolved by introducing edge or fog computing infrastructure.
Figure 1(b) shows an instance of vehicular IoT with physical objects (car, traffic light or beacons)
along with their cyber counterparts in virtual objects layer, and other E-ACO layers. It can be noted
that physical objects communicate with their virtual objects, and applications are accessing data
through cloud which is pushed by virtual entity of an object. Storage and processing icons at object
layer symbolizes road-side infrastructures which can help to store data from smart vehicles and
filter it before pushing data to cloud to save bandwidth. Virtual objects can be created at both fog
and central cloud to satisfy different applications and use-cases.
2.2 Relevant Background and Technologies
Smart cars and associated applications are still in early stages but involve some established tech-
nologies. Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) [20] have been discussed which support vehicle to
vehicle and infrastructure communication for user services. In VANETS, moving cars and infras-
tructure act as network nodes to provide storage, computation and other services. This concept
is further extended with the inclusion of cloud computing. Vehicular Clouds (VC) [29, 33, 54]
were proposed to integrate VANETs and cloud, to offer on-the fly edge/cloud platform to cars and
applications by utilizing on-board resources. VCs are relevant in smart cars real-time and location-
centric applications and services, which are otherwise impractical due to latency and bandwidth
issues of central cloud. Several VC architectures have been discussed including stationary, fixed
infrastructure or dynamic [47, 64].
Cyber threats to connected vehicles are very serious concerns. Government agencies and private
sectors are well aware of the risks involved and want to ensure that no open doors are left to
orchestrate attacks before wide adoption. The US Department of Transportation (USDOT) has
invested in Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) [25] which has connected vehicles as an impor-
tant component with aim to reduce accidental fatalities. Cyber security is a key area and along
with National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), it has released cyber-security
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guidelines [51, 52]. Security Credential Management System (SCMS) [63] is proposed as DSRC
message security solution in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communi-
cation. It uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based approach to enable trusted interaction where a
certificate authority issued certificate is attached to each BSM [1] to ensure vehicle trustworthiness.
US Government Accountability Office (GAO) [32] have widely discussed vulnerabilities and attack
surfaces in smart vehicles, and also proposed solutions to prevent such threats. European Union
Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) also studied critical assets and threats
in smart cars together with security mechanisms to mitigate them [30]. Cooperative Intelligent
Transport Systems (C-ITS) for European Union [60, 61] has defined a PKI-based trust model to
ensure authenticity and integrity of vehicle messages.
Homomorphic encryption based security solutions and protocols have been extensively discussed
to provide location proximity [44, 50, 66] which can help to provide location based services without
sharing the exact coordinates of drivers. These approaches can be used and complement our
proposed CV-ABACG model to resolve the privacy concerns of end users.
Access controls are widely used in computer systems to restrict unauthorized access to resources.
Park et al [55, 56] proposed an activity centric access control model for social networks which
considers user privacy policies in access decision. CV-ABACG model is inspired from this work
besides being a pure ABACmodel with dynamic groups which are pertinent in smart cars ecosystem.
3 ACCESS CONTROL NEEDS IN CONNECTED SMART CARS
Smart cars expose the conventionally isolated car systems to external environment via internet. The
dynamic and short-lived real time V2V and V2I interaction with entities in and around connected
vehicle needs to ensure message confidentiality and integrity, as also protection of on-board
resources from adversaries. This section provides an overview of access control requirements and
underlines the need for dynamic groups in smart vehicles IoT domain.
3.1 Multi-Layer Security Requirements and User Privacy Preferences
Broad attack surface exposed by connected vehicles is the first entry point to in-vehicle critical
systems. We believe that two level access control policies are the minimum essential to protect
the external interfaces and internal ECU communication. Access control for external environment
will protect on-board sensors, applications and user personal data from unauthorized access by
entities including vehicles, applications, masquerading remote mechanics or other adversaries.
Over-the air firmware update needs to be checked and must be allowed only from authorized
sources. An attacker even if successful in passing through the first check point, must be restricted at
the in-vehicle level, which secures overwrite and control of critical units (engine, brakes, telematics
etc.) from adversaries. Vehicles exchange BSMs which raises an important question about trust. It
must be ensured that information received is correct and from a trusted party, before being used
by on-vehicle applications. Applications access sensors within and outside the car, which must be
authorized, for example, a lane departure warning system accessing tire sensors must be checked
to prevent a spoofed application reading vehicle movements. A passenger accessing infotainment
(information and entertainment) systems of the car via Bluetooth or using his smartphone inside
car must also be authorized. Proper and resilient isolation is needed to protect critical vehicle
systems from being compromised through exposed entry points.
Smart cars location-based services enable notifications and alerts to vehicles. A user must be
allowed to set his personal preferences whether he wants to receive advertisements from certain
sources or filter out which ones are acceptable. For instance, a user may not want to receive
restaurant notifications but is interested in flash-flood warnings. Further, more fine grained policies
may be defined by a user, for example, a driver only wants notifications from cheesecake factory
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(a) Smart City with Geographical Location Groups (b) Example Groups Hierarchy
Fig. 2. Representative Groups in Connected Smart Cars Environment
and between 8 to 10 pm. System wide policy, like a speed warning to all over-speeding vehicles or
a policy of who can control speed of autonomous car are needed.
Data protection in cloud is critical due to frequent occurrence of data breaches. Big Data access
control [37–40] is essential when user privacy has to be ensured and unauthorized disclosure is
not allowed. Cross cloud trust models are needed to allow data access when mechanic application
in private cloud reads data in car-manufacturer cloud. Physical tampering of vehicle ECUs, OBD
and sensors also require parameter protection but is out of scope for this paper.
3.2 Relevance of Dynamic Groups in Mobile Vehicular IoT
Most smart cars applications and service requests from drivers are location specific and time
sensitive. For example, a driver might want to get warning signals when traveling near a blind spot,
in school zone or pedestrians crossing road. Further, notifications sent to drivers are short-lived and
mostly pertinent around current GPS coordinates. A gas discount notification from a nearby station,
an accident warning two blocks away or ice on the bridge, are some example where alerts are sent
to all vehicles in the area. Therefore, we believe that dynamically categorizing connected vehicles
into location groups will be helpful for scoping the vehicles to be notified instead of a general
broadcast and reduce administrative overheads, since single notification for the group will trigger
alerts for all its members. Also, entities present at a location have certain characteristics (like stop
sign warning, speed limit, deer-threat etc.) in common, which can be inherited by being a group
member. Figure 2(a) represents how various smart entities can be separated into different location
groups defined by appropriate authorities in a smart city system. These groups are dynamically
assigned to connected vehicles based on their attributes, personal preferences, interests or current
GPS coordinates as further elaborated in the model and implementation section discussed later.
Groups hierarchy can also exist, as shown in Figure 2(b), with sub-groups within a larger parent
group so as to reduce the number of vehicles to be notified. For instance, under location group,
sub-groups can be created for cars, buses, police vehicles or ambulances, to enable targeted alerts to
ambulances or police vehicle sub-groups defined within the location group. Groups can be defined
based on services, for example, a group of cars within the car parent group which take part in
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Fig. 3. A Conceptual CV-ABACG Model
car-pooling (CP) service or those which want to receive gas station offers. Group hierarchy [41, 59]
also enables attributes inheritance from parent to child groups. It helps in easy propagation and
administration of alerts (like flash flood, deer threat or ice on road), where an alert generated at
higher level of hierarchy (like a location group) is automatically trickled to all its children groups.
4 ACCESS CONTROL MODEL FOR CONNECTED VEHICLES ECOSYSTEM
Dynamic communication and data exchange among entities in connected vehicles ecosystem require
multi-layer access control policies, which are managed centrally and also driven by individual
user preferences. Therefore, an access control model must incorporate all such user and system
requirements and offer fine-grained authorization solutions. In this section, we will discuss and
formally define our proposed connected vehicle attribute-based access control model with dynamic
groups, which we refer as CV-ABACG.
4.1 CV-ABACG Model Components
The conceptual CV-ABACG model is shown in Figure 3 with formal definitions summarized in Table
1 and continued in Table 2. The basicmodel has following components: Sources (S), ClusteredObjects
(CO), Objects in clustered objects (O), Groups (G), Operations (OP), Activities (A), Authorization
Policies (POL), and Attributes (ATT).
Sources (S): These entities initiate activities (explained below) on various smart objects, groups
and applications in the ecosystem. A source can be a user, an application, administrator, sensor,
hand-held device, clustered object (such as a connected car), or a group defined in the system. For
instance, in case of flash flood or deer threat warning, activity source is police or city department
triggering an alert to all vehicles in the area. Similarly, car mechanic is a source, when he tries to
access data from on-board engine sensor in the car using his remote cloud based application. A
restaurant or gas-station issuing coupons are also considered as source.
Clustered Objects (CO): Clustered objects are particularly relevant in case of connected vehicles,
traffic lights or smart devices held by humans as they have multiple sensors and actuators. A
smart car with on-board sensors, ECUs (like tire pressure, lane departure, or engine control) and
applications is a clustered object. These smart entities interact and exchange data among themselves
and with others such as requestor source, applications or cloud. An important reason to incorporate
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clustered objects is to reflect cross-vehicle and intra-vehicle communication. The fact that two
smart vehicles can exchange basic safety messages (BSM) with each other shows clustered object
communication.
Objects in clustered objects (O): These are individual sensors, ECUs and applications installed in
clustered objects. Objects in smart cars include sensors for internal state of the vehicle, e.g., engine
diagnostics, emission control, cabin monitoring system, as well as sensors for external environment
such as cameras, temperature, rain, etc. Control commands can directly be issued to these objects,
and data can be read remotely. Applications (like lane departure warning system) on board can
also access data from these objects to provide alerts to driver or to a remote service provider.
Groups (G): A group is a logical collection of clustered objects with similar characteristics or
requirements. With these groups, subset of COs can be sent relevant notification and also attributes
can be assigned to group members. Some groups which can be defined smart vehicles ecosystem
include location specific groups, service specific groups (like car-pooling, gas station promotions
etc.) or vehicle type (a group of cars, buses etc.). Group hierarchy (GH) also exists which enables
attributes and policies inheritance from parent to children groups. For simplicity, we require that
a vehicle or CO can be direct member of only one group at same hierarchy level. For example, a
car can be in either location A or B group and but not both. Such restriction helps in managing
attributes inheritance and enhances the usability of our model.
Operations (OP): These are actions which can be performed against clustered objects, individual
objects or groups. Examples include: a mechanic performing read, write or control operations on
engine ECU, a restaurant triggering notifications to vehicles in location A group. Operations also
include administrative actions like creating or updating attributes or policies for COs, objects and
groups, which are usually performed by system/security administrators.
Activities (A): Activities encompass both operational and administrative activities which are
performed by various sources in the system. An activity can have one or many atomic operations
(OP) involved and will need authorization policies, which can be user privacy preferences, system
defined or both, to allow or deny an activity. For example, a car pooling notification activity
generated by a requestor (source) will be broadcast to all relevant vehicles in the locations nearby
using location groups, however individual drivers must also receive or respond to that request based
on individual preferences. A driver may not want to car-pool the requestor because of poor rating
or because he is not going to the destination the requestor asked for. Therefore, an activity can
involve multiple set of policies defined at different levels which must be evaluated, in car-pooling
case a policy is set to determine cars to be notified and then driver personal preferences. We have
primarily divided these smart car activities into following categories.
• Service Requests: These are activities initiated by entities or users (via applications). For instance,
a vehicle break-down initiates a service request to other vehicles around, or a user using a
smartphone initiates a car-pooling requests for a destination to cars which are available or have
opted in for the service.
• Administration: These activities perform administrative operations in system which include
changing policies and attributes of entities or determining the group hierarchy. It also defines
the scope of groups, how user privacy preferences are used, or how vehicles are determined to
be a member of a group etc.
• Notifications: These are group centric activities where all members are notified for any updates
about the group (like speed limit or deer threat notifications in location A) or for locations-based
marketing promotions by parking lots or restaurants.
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• Control and Usage: These activities include simple read, write or control operations performed
remotely or within a vehicle. Over the air updates issued by manufacturer or turning on car cli-
mate control using a smart key are remote activities whereas a passenger accessing infotainment
system using smartphone and on-board car applications reading car camera are local.
Authorization Policies and Attributes: CV-ABACG model incorporates individual user privacy
controls for different entities by managing authorization policies and entity attributes. As shown in
Figure 3, policy of sources include personal preferences, whereas attributes reflect characteristics
like name, age or gender. Policies can be defined for clustered objects, for instance, a USB can
be plugged only by car owner, or which mechanic can access an on-board sensor. Attributes of a
car include GPS coordinates, speed, heading direction, and vehicle size. Groups also set policies
and attributes for themselves, for example, car pooling group policy of who can be its member.
Similarly, system wide policies are also considered, for instance, policy to determine which groups
will be sent information when a request comes from a source, or policy to change group hierarchy.
Policies also include attributes of entities involved in an activity. A CO can inherit attributes from
dynamically assigned groups which will change as the CO leaves old group and adds to new group.
It should be noted that attributes of entities change more often than system wide or individual
policies. Attributes are more dynamic in nature which are added or removed with the movement
of vehicles or change in surroundings, like GPS coordinates or temperature. Policies once set by
administrators or users are more static and only the attributes which comprise the policy change
the outcome of a policy but the policy definition remains relatively fixed. For instance, a user
policy could state that ‘Send restaurant notifications only from Cheesecake factory’. In such case,
only attribute name of the restaurant sending the notification will be checked and if it is equal to
Cheesecake factory will be able to advertise to that user. Dynamic policies are also possible, for
instance, a policy may state that police vans in locations groups A and B are notified in case of
emergency, but, in case of a bigger threat this policy can be changed or overwritten with police vans
in groups A, B C and D. Our proposed model assumes that no policies or attributes are changed
during an activity evaluation process.
Some activities in the system will need multi-level policy evaluation and may also include user
privacy preferences before making a decision. For instance, a user must be allowed to decide if
he wants to share data from car sensors or whether wants to get marketing advertisements. Each
activity will evaluate required system and user policies to make final decision.
4.2 Formal Model Definitions
As shown in Table 1, sources, clustered objects, objects and groups can be directly assigned values
from the set of atomic values (denoted by Range(att)) for attribute att in set ATT. Each attribute
can be a set or atomic valued, determined by attType function and based on its type, entities can be
assigned a single value including null (⊥) for an atomic attribute, or multiple values for set-valued
attribute from the attribute range. POL is the set of authorization policies defined in the system
which will be defined below.
Clustered objects can be members of different groups, based on preferences and requirements.
For example, a car is assigned to a location group based on its GPS coordinates. In our model, we
assume that a clustered object can be directly assigned to only one group at same hierarchy level
(specified by directG function). As we will discuss later that since groups inherit attributes from
parent groups, assigning a clustered object to one parent group is sufficient to realize attributes
inheritance. Smart cars have sensors and applications installed in them, which can also be accessed
by different sources. Therefore, parentCO function determines the clustered object to which an
object belongs, which is a one to many mapping i.e an object can only belong to one CO while a
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Table 1. Formal CV-ABACG Model Definitions for Connected Vehicles Ecosystem
Basic Sets and Functions
– S, CO, O, G, OP are finite sets of sources, clustered objects, objects, groups and operations
respectively [blue circles in Figure 3].
– A is a finite set of activities which can be performed in system.
– ATT is a finite set of attributes associated with S, CO, O, G and system-wide.
– For each attribute att in ATT, Range(att) is a finite set of atomic values.
– attType: ATT = {set, atomic}, defines attributes to be set or atomic valued.
– Each attribute att in ATT maps entities in S, CO, O, G to attribute values. Formally,
att : S ∪ CO ∪ O ∪ G ∪ {system-wide}→
{
Range(att) ∪ {⊥} if attType(att) = atomic
2Range(att) if attType(att) = set
– POL is a finite set of authorization policies associated with individual S, CO, O, G.
– directG : CO→ G, mapping each clustered object to a system group,
equivalently CGA ⊆ CO × G.
– parentCO : O→ CO, mapping each object to a clustered object,
equivalently OCA ⊆ O × CO.
– GH ⊆ G × G, a partial order relation ⪰g on G.
Equivalently, parentG : G→ 2G, mapping group to a set of parent groups in hierarchy.
Effective Attributes of Groups, Clustered Objects and Objects (Derived Functions)
– For each attribute att in ATT such that attType(att) = set:
• effGatt : G→ 2Range(att), defined as effGatt(gi) = att(gi) ∪ ( ⋃
g ∈ {gj |gi ⪰g gj }
effGatt(g)).
• effCOatt : CO→ 2Range(att), defined as effCOatt(co) = att(co) ∪ effGatt(directG(co)).
• effOatt : O→ 2Range(att), defined as effOatt(o) = att(o) ∪ effCOatt(parentCO(o)).
– For each attribute att in ATT such that attType(att) = atomic:
• effGatt : G→ Range(att) ∪ {⊥},
defined as effGatt(gi) =

att(gi) if ∀g′ ∈ parentG(gi). effGatt(g′) = ⊥
effGatt(g′) if ∃ parentG(gi). effGatt(parentG(gi)) , ⊥ then select
parent g′ with effGatt(g′) , ⊥ updated most recently.
• effCOatt : CO→ Range(att) ∪ {⊥},
defined as effCOatt(co) =
{
att(co) if effGatt(directG(co)) = ⊥
effGatt(directG(co)) otherwise
• effOatt : O→ Range(att) ∪ {⊥},
defined as effOatt(o) =
{
att(o) if effCOatt(parentCO(o)) = ⊥
effCOatt(parentCO(o)) otherwise
CO can have multiple objects. Further, group hierarchy GH (shown as self loop on G), is defined
using a partial order relation on G and denoted by ⪰g, where д1 ⪰g д2 signifies д1 is child group of
д2 and д1 inherits all the attributes of д2. Function parentG computes the set of parent groups in
hierarchy for a child group.
The benefit to introduce groups is ease of administration where multiple attributes can be
assigned or removed from member clustered objects with single administrative operation. Group
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Table 2. Formal CV-ABACG Model Definitions for Connected Vehicles Ecosystem (Continued)
Authorization Functions (Policies)
– Authorization Function: For each op ∈ OP, Authop(s : S, ob : CO ∪ O ∪ G) is a propositional
logic formula returning true or false, which is defined using the following policy language:
• α F α ∧ α | α ∨ α | (α) | ¬α | ∃ x ∈ set.α | ∀ x ∈ set.α | set △ set | atomic ∈ set |
atomic < set
• △ F ⊂ | ⊆ | ⊈ | ∩ | ∪
• for att ∈ ATT, i ∈ S ∪ CO ∪ O ∪ G ∪ {system-wide}, attType(att) = set :
set F effatt(i) | att(i)
• for att ∈ ATT, i ∈ S ∪ CO ∪ O ∪ G ∪ {system-wide}, attType(att) = atomic :
atomic F effatt(i) | att(i) | value
Authorization Decision
– A source s ∈ S is allowed to perform an activity a ∈ A, stated as Authorization(a : A, s : S),
if the required policies needed to allow the activity are included and evaluated to make final
decision. These multi-layer policies must be evaluated for individual operations (opi ∈ OP)
to be performed by source s ∈ S on relevant objects (xi ∈ CO ∪ O ∪ G). Formally,
Authorization(a : A, s : S) ⇒
Authop1 (s : S, x1), Authop2 (s : S, x2), Authop3 (s : S, x3), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., Authopn (s : S, x3)
hierarchy enables attributes inheritance from parent to child groups. Therefore, in case of set
valued attributes, the effective attribute att of a group gi (denoted by effGatt(gi)) is the union of
directly assigned values for attribute att and the effective values for att for all its parent groups in
group hierarchy. This definition is well formed since ⪰g is a partial order. For a maximal group gj
in this ordering, we have effGatt(gj) = att(gj), giving base cases for this recursive definition. The
effective attribute values of clustered object for attribute att (stated as effCOatt) will then be the
directly assigned values for att and the effective attribute values of att for the group to which CO is
directly assigned (by directG). Similarly, in addition to direct attributes, sensors in car can inherit
attributes from the car itself (eg. make, model, location), effOatt calculates these effective attributes
of objects. For set valued attributes, union operation will be sufficient which is not true for atomic
attributes. In case of groups, the most recently updated non-null attribute values in parent groups
will overwrite the values of child group as defined in Table 1. For example, if the most recent
value updated in one of the parent groups for Deer_Threat attribute is ‘ON’, this value will trickle
to the child group. It should be noted that overwriting with the most recently updated value in
groups is one of the many approaches to inherit atomic attributes, but for the dynamic nature
of smart cars ecosystem, we believe this is most appropriate. Clustered object inherits non-null
atomic value from its direct parent group as stated by effCOatt(co) = effGatt(directG(co)). In case of
objects, parent clustered object will overwrite non-null atomic attributes. For atomic attributes, if
the parent(s) has null value for an attribute, the entity (group, clustered object or object) will retain
its directly assigned value without any overwrite. As part of administrative work, attributes for
entities must be carefully determined and allocated since inheritance may impact the attributes of
other associated entities in the system.
Authorization functions are defined for each operation op ∈ OP, which are policies defined in the
system. POL is the set of all authorization functions, Authop(s : S, ob : CO ∪ O ∪ G), which specify
the conditions under which source s ∈ S can execute operation op ∈ OP on object ob ∈ CO ∪ O ∪
G. Such policies include privacy preferences set by users for individual clustered object, objects
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(a) System Architecture (b) AWS Components
Fig. 4. AWS Cloud Assisted Prototype Architecture
and groups or can be system wide by security administrators. The conditions can be specified as
propositional logic formula using policy language defined in Table 2. Multiple policies must be
satisfied before an activity is allowed to perform. Authorization function,Authorization(a : A, s : S),
where an activity a ∈ A is allowed by source s ∈ S, specifies the system level, user privacy policies
or other relevant policies returning true for an activity to succeed.
CV-ABACG is an attribute-based access control model which satisfies fine-grained authorization
needs of dynamic, location oriented and time sensitive services and applications in cloud assisted
smart cars ecosystem. The model supports personalized privacy controls by utilizing individual
user policies and attributes, along with dynamic groups assignment. Our model assumes that the
information and attributes shared by source and object entities are trusted, for instance, location
coordinates sent by a car are correct, and uses this shared information tomake access and notification
decisions. How to ensure that the information is from a trusted source or is correct is out of the
scope of this work.
5 CV-ABACG MODEL ENFORCEMENT IN AWS
In this section, we present a proof of concept demonstration of CV-ABACG model by enforcing
a use case of smart cars using AWS IoT service [5]. The implementation will demonstrate how
dynamic groups assignment and multi-layer authorization policies required in connected vehicle
ecosystem can be realized in AWS. We have used simulations to reflect real connected smart
vehicles, however, it does not undermine the plausibility, use and advantage of our proposed model
as further elaborated in following discussion. It should be noted that no long term vehicle data
including real-time GPS coordinates are collected in central cloud, which mitigates user privacy
concerns and encourages wide adoption of the model.
5.1 System Architecture
Figure 4 shows the overall system architecture along with different components used to implement
prototype. Vehicles and infrastructure smart devices are simulated as virtual machines with a
MQTT client, sending MQTT payload to the central broker provided by the AWS IoT cloud platform
as shown in Figure 4(a). AWS IoT provides a custom endpoint that allows to connect devices to
AWS IoT, where each devices have a REST API available at the endpoint. MQTT broker provided
by AWS IoT, enables clients (devices) to publish and subscribe to their reserved and secure topic to
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Fig. 5. Three Level Groups Hierarchy Defined in AWS Implementation
get and publish messages from other smart entities via the cloud. These reserved topics [18] enable
device to update, get or delete the state information of the device shadows [16] created in the AWS
IoT service. Publishing and subscribing to these topics need authorization [27] which ensures that
only allowed devices are able to communicate through the cloud. AWS Lambda function [6] is
an event-driven serverless platform service to run code, and is used to implement, enforce (PEP-
Policy Enforcement Point) and decide (PDP - Policy Decision Point) [45] the attribute based security
polices defined in the system. AWS Lambda function is also used to implement our proposed
smart-car controller which helps to assign moving vehicles to dynamic groups and enable attributes
and alerts inheritance. Figure 4(b) shows details of AWS cloud components, reflecting where device
shadows [11], certificates [15] and groups [17] are created in AWS IoT service and MQTT broker
acting as a server, providing a client server architecture with IoT devices simulated in the system.
5.2 Description of Use Cases
Location based alerts and notifications are important in smart cars applications and motivate
our use cases. We will build upon our defined group hierarchy in AWS shown in Figure 5. Our
implementation will enforce access controls and notification relevance in following use cases:
DeerThreatNotification - Smart infrastructure in the city can sense the surrounding environment
and notify group(s) regarding the change. In this use case, a motion sensor senses deers in the area
and changes Deer_Threat attribute of location group to ON which in-turn sends alerts to all member
vehicles in that location. Similar, implementation can be done in case of accident notification, speed
limit warning or location based marketing.
Car-Pooling - A traveller needs a ride to Location-A. Using a mobile application, he sends car-
pooling requests to vehicles in his vicinity which are heading to the destination location asked
by the traveller. The request is received by AWS cloud, which computes location and appropriate
groups based on the coordinates of the requester, to publish notifications to nearby cars. All the
members of group Car-A, B, C or D can get the request, but some cars may not want to be part of
car-pooling, or do not want some requestors to join them because of ratings. User policies will be
also checked before a driver is notified of likely car-pool customer.
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Fig. 6. Simulated Vehicles Fixed Path and Static Location Groups Demarcation
5.3 Prototype Implementation
AWS implementation of our model in these use-cases involves two phases: administrative phase and
operational phase. Administrative part involves creation of groups hierarchy, dynamic assignment
of moving vehicles to different location and sub-groups, attributes inheritance from parent to child
groups and to group members, and attributes modification of entities. Operational part covers
how groups are used to scope down the number of vehicles who receive messages or notifications
from different sources. Both these phases involve multi-layer access control polices. We created
an ABAC policy decision (PDP) and enforcement point (PEP) [45], and implemented our external
policy evaluation engine which is hooked with AWS to enable attribute-based authorization.
Administrative Phase:We defined a group hierarchy in AWS as shown in Figure 5. In this three
level hierarchy, County-XYZ is divided into four disjoint Location-A, B, C and D groups, with each
having Car and Bus subgroups for vehicle type car or bus. We created 50 vehicles and simulated
their movement using a python script which publishes MQTT message to shadows of these vehicles
with current GPS coordinates (generated using Google API [12]) iterated over green dots shown in
Figure 6. The area was demarcated into four locations and a moving vehicle belongs to a subgroup
in one of these groups whereas fixed sensor devices remained assigned to one group only. Assuming
current location of Vehicle-1 as Location-D, and it publishes MQTT message with payload:
{"state": {"reported": {"Latitude": "29.4769353","Longitude":"-98.5018237"}}}
to AWS topic: $aws/things/Vehicle-1/shadow/update, its new location changes to Location-A
and since we defined the vehicle type as car, it is assigned to Car-A group under Location-A as
shown by snapshot in Figure 7. This table keeps on updating as the vehicles move from one location
to another, based on their current GPS coordinates sent to the central cloud periodically along with
other relevant attributes. Such change ensure that the alerts and notifications received by these
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Fig. 7. Snapshot of Table Showing Dynamic Groups and Associated Connected Vehicles at One Point of Time
(Table keeps on updating as vehicles move)
vehicles are relevant to their current location. Both attributes, vehicle type and current coordinates
of vehicle, are used to dynamically assign groups, which is important in moving smart vehicles.
These functionalities are implemented as a stand alone service (can be enforced as a Lambda service
[6] function) using Boto [7] which is the AWS SDK for Python. Further, in case of deer threat
notification use-case, we simulated a location-sensor which senses deers in the area and updates
the attribute ‘Deer_Threat’ of location group to ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’, which is then notified to all members
of location and its subgroups. An attribute-based policy is defined to control which sensors are
allowed to change the ‘Deer_Threat’ attribute of location groups. Figure 8 shows the snippet of
policies implemented in our prototype. The JSON format policy file defines a set of policies for two
operations: one for Deer_Threat and another for car_pool_notification, as marked by red box. The
blue box specifies the attributes of source, also known as initiator of operation request, whereas
the green box specifies the attributes of target object to which the action is requested. As shown in
Figure 8, our defined policy for Deer_Threat operation checks that a motion sensor with name =
‘Sensor-X’ and currently member of group Location-A can update the value of attribute Deer_Threat
for location group Location-A only, and if sensor is relocated to Location-B it can update same
attribute for Location-B group only. This policy ensures that the sensor must be in that location
group for which it is updating Deer_Threat attribute, which is needed security requirement as we
don’t want adversaries to remotely change attributes and trigger unwanted alerts for vehicles.
A moving vehicle updates its coordinates to AWS shadow service, which along with attributes
of vehicles and location groups determines if the vehicle can be member of the group using our
external enforcement service. If authorization policy allows vehicle to be a member of group, the
vehicle and group is notified and vehicle inherits all attributes of its newly assigned group. Similarly,
if attribute ‘Deer_Threat’ of group is allowed (by authorization policy) to be changed by the location
sensor, the new values are propagated to all its members. We implemented attribute inheritance
from parent to child groups through our service using update_thing_group and update_thing
methods. In our use-case attributes inheritance exist from Location-A to all both subgroups Car-A
and Bus-A, and to vehicles in Car-A and Bus-A. Therefore, when attribute ‘Deer_Threat’ is set to
ON in group Location-A, its new attributes using Boto describe_thing_group command are:
{‘Center-Latitude’: ‘29.4745’, ‘Center-Longitude’: ‘-98.503’,
‘Deer_Threat’: ‘ON’}
This inherits the attributes to Car-A child group whose effective attributes will now be:
{‘Center-Latitude’: ‘29.4745’, ‘Center-Longitude’: ‘-98.503’,
‘Deer_Threat’: ‘ON’, ‘Location’: ‘A’}
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Fig. 8. Snippet of Attribute Based Policies Implemented in AWS
As shown in Figure 7, both Vehicle-1 and Vehicle-2 are members of Car-A sub-group, therefore, the
effective attributes of Vehicle-2 are:
{‘Center-Latitude’: ‘29.4745’, ‘Center-Longitude’: ‘-98.503’,
‘Deer_Threat’: ‘ON’, ‘Location’: ‘A’,
‘Type’: ‘Car’, ‘VIN’: ‘9246572903752’, ‘thingName’: ‘Vehicle-2’}
where ‘Center-Latitude’,‘Center-Longitude’,‘Deer_Threat’ and‘Location’ are inherited
attributes from the member group Car-A and ‘Type’, ‘VIN’ and ‘thingName’ are Vehicle-2 direct
assigned attributes. Similar attributes inheritance is witnessed for Vehicle-1 and other vehicles.
The complete sequence of events performed in AWS along with our stand-alone service for the
administrative phase is shown in Figure 9. A moving vehicle sends MQTT message with location
coordinates to its reserved topic in the AWS cloud shadow service. Our external stand-alone service,
checks the location and attributes of vehicle together with group attributes to determine if the
vehicle is within the range of group and can be dynamically assigned. If the vehicle becomes
member of the group, its virtual shadow inherits attributes of its member group which are then
updated for the real physical vehicle using thing registry. Once a vehicle becomes member of group,
any change in the attributes of associated group results in attribute update for the member vehicles.
As shown in the lower part of Figure 9, a road side sensor publishing a new value for the attribute,
the security policy implemented in the cloud will be checked by the proposed service. If the policy
allows the requested change, the values are updated for the members via thing registry and shadow
service. This explains the sequence of steps for administrative phase of our prototype.
Operational Phase: In this phase, attribute-based policies are used to restrict service and noti-
fication activities which may require single or multi-level policies along with user preferences.
In car-pooling use case, we defined policies to restrict notifications to only a subset of relevant
vehicles in specific locations. We simulated requestor in AWS needing car-pool. It has attribute
‘destination’ with value in Location-A, B, C or D. Requestor sends current and destination location
as MQTT message to AWS topic $aws/things/Requestor/shadow/update which based on these
attributes determine subgroups to which service requests is sent.
{"state": {"reported": {"policy": "car_pool_notification",
"source": "Location-A",
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Fig. 9. Sequence Diagram for Dynamic Groups and Attributes Assignment in AWS
"destination": "Location-B"}}}
The policy for car_pool_notification operation (shown in Figure 8) suggests that if current
location of source requestor is ‘Location-A’ and destination location is somewhere in ‘Location-A’
then all members of sub-group Car-A should be notified. Similarly, if the destination attribute is
Location-B, then all members of Car-A, Car-B and Car-C needs notification. In our use-case, all
members of these sub-groups are notified. The policy restricts the number of vehicles which will
be requested as compared to all vehicles getting irrelevant notification (as they are far from the
requestor or are not vehicle type car) and illustrates the importance of location-centric smart car
ecosystem. Similarly, location-based marketing can be restricted and policies can be defined to
control such notifications.
User privacy policies take into effect once the subset of vehicles is calculated. These policies
encapsulate user preferences, for instance, in car pooling a particular driver is not going to the
destination requested by the requestor in his request or a driver do not want restaurant adver-
tisements, therefore such notifications will not be displayed on his car dashboard. These local
policies are implemented using AWS Greengrass [4] which allows to run local lambda functions
on the device (in our case a connected vehicle) to enable edge computing facility, an important
requirement in real-time smart car applications and enforce privacy policies. Once accepted by
drivers, a SNS (AWS Simple Notification Service) [8] message can be triggered for requestor from
accepting vehicles along with name and vehicle number. The sequence of events for car-pooling
activity and multi-layer authorization policies together with user personal preferences is shown
in Figure 10. As can be seen, the source sends MQTT message with location, attributes and type
of service request to the shadow service in the cloud. Once the proposed service (encapsulating
the policy decision and enforcement engine) checks the request against the policies defined and
enforce decision, notifications are sent to relevant groups and then to member vehicles. Second
layer of policy enforcement is done at the individual vehicles. These user privacy policies can be
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Fig. 10. Sequence Diagram for Attributes Based Authorization in AWS
implemented using AWS Greengrass [4], where the final authorization check is done. If the user
preference policy rejects such notifications, central cloud service is notified and subsequently the
request from the source user has been denied.
Our proposed external service to implement ABAC policy decision and evaluation helps achieve
fine grained authorization needed in smart cars ecosystem. The implementation also demonstrates
dynamic groups assignment based on mobile vehicle GPS coordinates and attributes along with
groups based attributes inheritance which offer administrative benefits in enforcing an ABAC
model. In this entire implementation, no persistent data from moving vehicles is collected or stored
by the central authority hosted cloud which reaffirms its privacy preserving benefits. Note that the
use-cases discussed to enforce CV-ABACG are not real-time and can bear some latency due to the
use of cloud infrastructure. Although our CV-ABACG enforcement in AWS reflects its use for cloud
based applications, we believe similar model can also be implemented in edge (or fog) systems as
well to cater more real-time use-cases.
5.4 Performance Evaluation Metrics
We evaluated the performance of our proposed CV-ABACG model in AWS and discuss metrics
to reflect the impact of our stand-alone external service to have security enhanced smart-car
ecosystem. To simulate the environment, we have simulated 50 moving vehicles and used our
smart-car controller to randomly spread them across four location sub-groups pre-defined in the
system as shown in Figure 6. In our evaluation, we provide two types of metrics for both the
use-cases, the first metric elaborates the policy enforcer execution time for the security policies
defined in Figure 8, and the second metric provides the comparison of when no policies were used
in the system against our implemented ABAC policies. Table 3 describes our external policy engine
execution time for deer-threat and car-pool use-cases. This time (in milliseconds) primarily shows
how long it takes to evaluate the implemented policies after action requests for different operations
are received by the cloud implemented policy engine. The table aggregates the policy evaluation
time against number of action requests, for example, the total time it takes to evaluate the policy
for 10 random car-pool requests is 0.0922 ms. Clearly, the engine is very efficient and has minimal
impact when used in cloud assisted smart-cars system.
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Table 3. Attributes Based Policy Enforcement Time (in Milliseconds)
Policy Enforcer Execution TimeNumber of Action
Requests Deer-Threat Car-Pool
10 0.0813 0.0922
20 0.1551 0.2003
30 0.2369 0.2872
40 0.3150 0.3953
50 0.3903 0.5196
Fig. 11. Comparing the Scoping and Relevance of Alerts with and without Policy
Next, we show the impact of how enforcing policies in the system ensures the relevance and scope
of alerts received by smart cars. One of the major push and advantage for smart and connected
vehicles is to have on-board advertisements and alerts to offer convenience and safety to the
drivers. But at the same time, drivers also do not want to be bothered by notifications which are
completely irrelevant and extraneous like receiving a coupon from a restaurant which is 50 miles
away. Therefore, to ensure such incidents do not pester and divert drivers attention, our proposed
ABAC policies can be helpful. Figure 11 shows the number of vehicles notified for deer threat
and car-pool notifications with and without the policy. Without the policy, irrespective of the
vehicle location or the driver personal preferences all the vehicles in the system are notified (which
in our case is 50) when a random request is generated. However, when the cloud based policies
are enforced, it ensures that only vehicles to which the notifications are relevant are alerted. For
example, in Figure 11, on 25th car-pool request only 23 vehicles were notified for the request as
compared to all vehicles even when one would have been 20 miles away from the requestor. These
subset of vehicles is calculated based on the number of cars which are in the location groups which
are near to the originating source, or the manner in which attribute based polices are defined
by the administrator. Similar results can be shown for deer-threats alerts, where only cars in the
proximity of sensed deers are notified. It must be noted that, in Figure 11 we have clubbed together
the notified cars for both the use-cases, however, the nth request for car-pool is completely separate
from the nth request for deer-threat case. The prime motive of this metric is to reflect how the
policies enable notification relevance and scoping of target vehicles.
The performance graph shown in Figure 12 compares the execution time when no policy is
executed (orange line) against implemented ABAC policy (blue line) for deer-threat and car pool
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(a) Deer Threat Use Case
(b) Car Pool Use Case
Fig. 12. Performance Comparison with and without ABAC policy
use-cases. Since the main focus of this experiment is to measure the impact of the proposed ABAC
policy based security solution, this metric evaluates the time it takes to calculate the list of vehicles
to be notified with and without the policy. The X axis is each graph shows the total number of
execution requests i.e. the number of times deer-threat (Figure 12(a)) or car-pool (Figure 12(b))
notifications are generated and Y axis denote the total time (in milliseconds) from the moment the
access or notification request is received by the Lambda function in cloud till the number of vehicles
to be notified is calculated. Since, in our experiments the policy (shown in Figure 8) definition for
each access requests in both deer-threat and car-pool are near identical, we observe that the number
of access requests increase the number of times the policy is evaluated and so its total evaluation
time also increases. Minor variations in the orange and blue lines (in graphs Figure 12) are because
of AWS API endpoint calls being made from the Lambda function to calculate the number of vehicles
notified in both the cases, which can change based on the internal communication technologies
used by the cloud services. Our proposed external policy engine does have some impact on the
performance (as shown with blue line) as opposed to no policy when used with number of vehicles.
However, we believe when used in city wide scenario this time will be overshadowed by cloud
assisted notification time to all vehicles against a subset of vehicles provided by the policy evaluation
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engine. Our model and the prototype implementation of use-cases are focused to ensure service
relevance to moving vehicles on road which is well achieved even with a little tradeoff.
The prototype implementation and performance metrics in Section 5, provide a comprehensive
understanding of how the capabilities of cloud are used to provide a secure and privacy aware
smart car environment. In this implementation, we illustrated how attributes based polices can be
implemented in the system, and their application to ensure fine grained access control and activity
centric authorization in smart cars. The most important advantage of using cloud based security
service is the ‘infinite’ capabilities and auto-scaling provided by the cloud which can help to cater
a large number of smart vehicles in city wide geography. As mentioned earlier, their are associated
administrative operations in this proposed solution like demarcating location group boundaries,
setting group hierarchy, administering and modifying attributes of groups, defining attributes based
security policies etc. which must be done in a diligent manner by the city administration to fully
realize the potential of proposed secure cloud assisted smart cars ecosystem.
It is considered that a practical smart city transportation scenario will have hundreds and
thousands of moving cars (and other connected entities) associated to cloud (or fog infrastructures)
interacting and initiating alerts for entities. Although a detailed performance evaluation is very
desirable by having large sets of real moving vehicles, we believe that our proof of concept in AWS
is to showcase the practical viability, application and use of fine grained attribute based security
policies in context of smart cars ecosystem, without the need to capture large set of data points
from real world traffic scenarios spread across wide geographic area and sizable on-road moving
vehicles. Such scaled setting will only stress the entire system without reflecting any change in
security policy evaluation. It should be noted that Amazon Web Service (AWS) is just one of the
cloud based platforms to realize the proposed model and similar prototype can be implemented in
other cloud computing services including Microsoft Azure [13], Google Cloud [9] or Openstack
[14]. The main objective of this paper is to propose the specification and introduction of ABAC
policies in a cloud assisted smart cars environment without focusing on any one cloud platform.
6 SUMMARY
This research work presents a fine-grained attribute-based access control model for time-sensitive
and location-centric smart cars ecosystem. Our model introduces the novel notion of dynamic
groups in relation to connected vehicles and emphasizes its relevance in this context. Besides
considering system wide authorization policies, this model also supports personal preference
policies for different users, which is required in today’s privacy conscious world. Several real world
use-cases are discussed and a proof of concept implementation of our CV-ABACG model is shown in
Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud platform. We created a smart car controller to demonstrate how
moving vehicles can be dynamically assigned to location and sub-groups defined in the system based
on the current GPS coordinates, vehicle-type and other attributes, besides the use of attribute based
security policies in distributed and mobile connected cars ecosystem. Detailed performance metrics
have been evaluated for deer-threat and car-pool use-cases to determine activity access control
decision when groups and ABAC policies are used against when no security policies are available.
We plan to extend this model to introduce in-vehicle security and built risk aware trust-based models
for smart vehicles environment. Further, it is important to introduce location privacy preserving
approaches such as homomorphic encryption and other anonymity techniques to complement and
extend our model which can mitigate location sharing concerns without effecting its advantages
and application. Similar approach for V2X trusted DSRC communication and privacy concerns
also need further investigation, which we are currently working in a direction to propose a secure
intelligent transportation system.
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